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Abstract 
This paper analyzes contract efficiency with regard to correlated project reali-
zation and the size of the borrowers in group lending. Firstly, I show that un-
der the standard assumption of independent project payoffs, the expected 
group cost of default decreases with group size. Secondly, I show that small 
groups can also optimize group efficiency if individual payoffs and credit risks 
are correlated. The results outline that social cost minimization occurs due to 
a common interest in forming optimal borrower groups between lenders and 
borrowers.  
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1. Introduction 
The United Nations recognizes the importance of microfinance as a major tool 
for achieving Millennium Development Goals. One of these goals is helping the 
poor and needy to break out of poverty, thereby promoting economic growth. 
The microfinance sector provides different financial services like microsaving, 
microinsurances, remittances, microloans, and other basic financial services to 
the underserved or vulnerable parts of society. The development of microcredit 
gives the poor access to capital. Microloans facilitate provisions of low value cre-
dits and the most typical characteristics are: (a) the micro-borrowers are from 
low-income groups and are excluded from the financial sector; (b) the micro-
finance-clients are predominantly female. (c) The loan values are small amounts. 
(d) The loans are borrowed to generate income activities or for other basic needs. 
(e) The credit term of the loan is short e.g., small weekly repayments. (f) The 
low-income customers have insufficient or even no physical collateral and no 
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credit history. 
Currently, microfinance institutions (MFIs) use diverse models to provide 
micro loans. Most of these MFI models are based on group lending and known 
as the Joint Liability Group (JLG). The size of the groups can vary from five 
borrowers for the Grameen Model, to 15 - 30 for Village Banking and Self Help 
Groups (e.g., FINCA group involves 30 women). With the JLG method, the 
borrowers build groups voluntarily and guarantee each other’s loans. If any 
member of the group runs into repayment problems, the other individuals are 
responsible and need to repay that loan. For JLG practices, the rate of recovery is 
high, for instance the Grammen Bank reports a level of $98.76$ percent [1]. 
Because the group members come from the same neighborhood, they are well 
informed about the ability and willingness of fellow members to repay their 
loans. Thus, a JLG can replace the lack of physical collateral and helps to reduce 
the problems of asymmetrical information (e.g., [2] [3] [4]). Conversely, self- 
selected group members, who have similar characteristics (e.g., same village, 
same gender, same type of business, same level of education etc.) can generate a 
negative impact on risk-sharing within the group. Consequently, the risk sharing 
becomes increasingly difficult for large groups due to the snowball effect of de-
faulting on loans (e.g., [5]). 
There is extensive literature showing how group lending contracts can im-
prove efficiency in contexts where borrowers share some social asset. However, 
the literature almost always engages with group size of two borrowers, and ig-
nores correlated risk. Some of the first formal models, to discuss group size, are 
provided by [6], [7] and [8]. These papers discussed how when group size is 
placed in different context, large group size can improve efficiency. Baland et al., 
(2013) [9] explored interaction between group size, wealth and projects charac-
teristics. They showed, that a small group size can increase efficiency when 
access to credit is limited by strategic default and found that group lending with 
two borrowers in never optimal for small loans but the benefit is not monotonic. 
For example, [10] assumed that project are statistically independent and shown 
in the adverse selection, the ex ante moral hazard and the ex post moral hazard 
settings, how the effect of group size varies with social capital. He founded that 
some social asset is essential for endogenous group size to have any effect. 
Yet, the research does not present a fully settled view on group size. I explore 
the interaction between group size and correlated project realizations in the set-
ting of strategic default, in contrast to earlier theoretical literature (e.g., [11] [12] 
[13] [14]). This paper contributes to the literature on group size in micro lend-
ing in two ways, namely the structure and performance of optimal group credit 
contracts group size and the degree of correlated risk varies this document seeks 
to generalize along both group-size and correlated risk dimensions in the stra-
tegic default context. My results show that by distinguishing group size variation 
and correlated project realization in the group building processes yields more 
accurate theories of micro credit and, in turn, improves our understanding of 
group lending. 
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Many theoretical researches on group lending assume that the project realiza-
tions are statistically independent, thus a part of the risk can be diversified. As 
shown in this paper (see Section 3) a bigger group is better in the risk sharing 
and minimizing of deadweight losses. By introducing the statistical linear rela-
tionship (see Sections 4 und 5), I find the optimal group size is unique to each 
group. This paper provides the novel theoretical explanation of a strong rela-
tionship between correlated project outcomes and group size while focuses on 
the limited abilities of risk sharing within the homogeneous group.  
The rest of the article is organized as follows. The next section starts with a 
brief overview of the study of [13], henceforth: “RS” as a benchmark. The RS 
theory engages with mechanism design, which investigates the impact of JLG on 
formal and informal contractual arrangements influenced by internal and exter-
nal frictions. In Sections 3, 4, and 5, I modify the RS-setting, which is based on a 
group size of more than two borrowers and the correlated project realization. 
Section 6 shows a numerical example. Finally, I present some concluding re-
marks and discuss potential implications for future research. 
2. The Basic Model 
The RS model only considers the problem of strategic default. Similar to the RS- 
model, I initially analyzed the environment with two borrowers 2n = . They are 
homogeneous by risk and endowed each borrower with a risky projects and one 
unit of labor. Because of the homogeneity assumption, the projects have the 
same probability of success 0 1p< < , and generate income 0h >  per borrow-
er. The payoff is a Bernoulli random variable  
( )
1, for
~
0, for .
X p
X Ber p
X q
=
=  =
 
Thus with the probability ( )1P X p= =  corresponding to a payoff of 0h >  
and ( )0 1P X p q= = − ≡  corresponding to a payoff of zero ( )0h = . Villagers 
are risk-neutral and have a choice between being an employee or investing in 
their own business. Said borrowers have no physical capital and the local lenders, 
MFIs, provide the only way for them to raise money. By deciding to create a 
business, they can choose to accept either a JLG contract or an individual lend-
ing (IL) contract. Borrowers can observe the realization of the project and each 
other’s goals at no cost. I assume that alternative income generating activities 
creates wealth 0u = . The borrowers observe the each others’ project realiza-
tions free of charge. 
The MFIs operate on either on a perfectly competitive market so that it cannot 
charge more than it costs or they are a non-profit organization. The lenders are 
also risk-neutral and have no information about the borrowers’ actions. Thus 
they can only observe this state by paying an observational cost. To reduce stra-
tegic default in this model, the MFIs can impose endogenous non-monetary pu-
nishments C, which create deadweight losses and market inefficiency (see e.g. 
[11] [14], p. 62). I assume that the decision maker will behave rationally. The 
challenge in this setting is to delineate efficient contracts by minimizing the total 
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expected cost of default, which is defined for the group lending contract with 
two borrowers as follows: with ( )2 1 2 20, 0EC P X X C≡ = =  and for the indi-
vidual lending contract with ( )1 10 , 1, 2iEC P X C i≡ = ∀ = . 
Definition: A loan contract is efficient and maximizes borrowers utilities if it 
satisfied this criteria: 
 minimizing the expected cost of default (known as deadweight losses) subject 
to (a) borrowers’ participation constraints (PC), (b) MFI’s break-even con-
straint (ZPC), and (c) incentive compatibility constraints (ICC). 
 If the condition 2 1EC EC≤  holds, the group-based contract dominates the 
individual liability loan. 
To compute this condition, we compare Equation (6) with Equation (10), 
which is shown as inequality (11). Assuming borrowers decide on an invest-
ment, financed by a group lending contract, then four states of probabilities are 
possible, as shown in Table 1. If projects are randomly distributed then both 
borrowers are successful with the probability 2sp . With the probability 2fp  
both borrowers fail, and with the probabilities 2cp  the debt payments are pro-
tected by joint liability. 
I use the information in Table 1 and Equation (1) to determine three contract 
constraints, which are summarized below 
( )2 2 22 1 .s c fp p p+ = −


                       (1) 
For individual lending (IL) the borrowers’ expected utility is given by 
( )1 1 1.EU E h R EC= − −                       (2) 
Thus the borrowers’ participation constraint can be rewritten as  
( )1 1: .i iPC E h R EC u− − ≥                      (3) 
By solving the lender break-even constraint the MFI charges the interest rate 
1 1
1: .ZPC R
p
=                           (4) 
Besides both constraints above, the incentive compatibility constraint can be 
rewritten as 
min
1 1 1 1: .ICC C C R≥ ≡                        (5) 
 
Table 1. The four possible states of randomly distributed payoffs. 
 Borrower 2 
Borrower 1 
 
Success: 0h >  
with ( )1P X =  
Failure: 0h =  
with ( )0P X =  Σ 
Success: 0h >  
with ( )1P X =  
2
2
sp p=  2
cp qp=  p  
Failure: 0h =  
with ( )0P X =  2
cp qp=  22
fp q=  q  
Σ p  q  1 
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Therefore, each borrowers’ expected cost of default reads as follows in Equa-
tion (6) 
1 1 .
qEC qR
p
≡ =                           (6) 
In the case for group lending with two borrowers is applicable. The borrowers’ 
participation constraint can be rewritten as follows in inequality (7) 
( )2 2 2 2: .PC E h R EC u− − ≥                       (7) 
By solving the lender break-even constraint and the incentive compatibility 
constraint the MFI charges the interest rate and the non-monetary punishments 
C as follow in Equation (8) and inequality (9) 
2 2
2
1: ,
1 f
ZPC R
p
=
−
                        (8) 
min
2 2 2 2: 2 .ICC C C R≥ ≡                        (9) 
In the context of JLG, the expected cost of default for each borrower is given 
by the following 
2 2
2 2
2
2 2 .
1
f
f
pEC q R
p
≡ =
−
                     (10) 
Then, group-based contracts 2EC , shown as Equation (10), are compared 
with individual lending contracts 1EC , and shown as Equation (6). 
Main findings from RS (2010): the group-based contracts are more efficient in 
comparison to individual-based contracts with regard to reduction of social 
costs. It does not matter whether the group’s commitments, to help each other 
are formal or informal arrangements. The condition described as inequality (11) 
holds for the group-based contracts with the size of 2n =  borrowers  
2 1EC EC<                            (11) 
These findings hold true as long as the borrowers are fully informed about the 
other members within the group. If there is internal friction within the group, 
the lender can create an environment (e.g., public meeting or message game) to 
achieve the second best or even the first best solution outcome for the borrowers 
(see e.g. [13]). 
3. Efficiency Lending Contracts with n ≥ 2 Borrowers 
In the previous section, I consider the group size of two borrowers. To check the 
robustness of RS results I extend the model from 2n =  to 2n >  borrowers, as 
formulated in Proposition (1). Moreover, I assume, without leaving out anything 
essential that expected project payoffs h are uncorrelated and large enough to sa-
tisfy inequality (12) 
Eh ER nph n⇒> >                      (12) 
and 1n∀ >  implies 1ph > . The expected repayment would be nER n= , so 
the bank breaks even and implies each villager’s expected surplus 
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( ) ( )1 0.n nE h R n ph− = − >                    (13) 
In the case for group lending with more than two borrowers: 
( ): 0n n n nPC E h R EC− − ≥                    (14) 
1:
1n n n
ZPC R
q
=
−
                      (15) 
min:n n n nICC C C nR≥ ≡                      (16) 
In the context of JLG, the expected cost of default for each borrower is given 
by the following Equation (17) 
.
1
n
n
n n n
nqEC q nR
q
≡ =
−
                     (17) 
Proposition 1 (Efficiency of JLG with n > 2): 
If the outcomes of all borrowers’s projects are a Bernoulli random variable 
( )~X Ber p  with parameter p , expected value ( )E X p=  and with Variance 
( )Var X pq= , then Comparing the group lending to individual lending con-
tracts, the JLG always minimizes the social costs of the group for all group sizes 
larger than one 
11
n
n n
nq qEC EC
pq
≡ < ≡
−
 
Prof:  
1. If 1 2, , , nX X X  are discrete random variables with parameter ( )0i iP X q= =  
then their joint probabilities of default is computed by  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1 20, 0, , 0 0 0 0 ,n nP X X X P X P X P X= = = = = = ∗ ∗ =   
2. then it is equivalent to nq q q∗ ∗ = . 
3. According to 
lim 0n nE→∞ =  and with 0n
EC
n
∂
<
∂
. 
I prove the robustness of the RS theory and conclude that the larger the group 
size, the smaller the social costs, which are defined by the expected cost of de-
fault as in (17).                                                     
It is remarkable within this framework that by increasing n, the Second Best 
equivalent to the First Best solution can be obtained. 
4. The Correlated Project Realization 
The considering that in practice the risk of defaults is correlated, I verify posi-
tion that:”The existence of correlation would only strengthen the results of this 
analysis” ([3], p. 353). For Example, [15] analyzes inter-group risk sharing and 
concludes that the defaults of the self selected group members are correlated and 
thus illuminates the anti-diversification results. Both statements allow me to as-
sume that the borrowers’ project returns are linearly dependent. Through this 
assumption, I can observe the impact of the correlation on RS-results in the 
group lending framework. 
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Again for simplicity, I start with a group size of two borrowers. Unlike the 
previous assumption, the payoff of both borrowers is correlated. In this set up 
with two borrowers, there are four possible probability realizations as expressed 
in Table 2. 
In this Table 2, in the first case with a probability of , 22sp pρ ρ= +  , with 
pqρ ρ=  (obtained from (19) and (20))both borrowers are successful and repay 
their debt completely. The second and third cases are symmetrical: with a prob-
ability of ,2cp pqρ ρ= −  , both of these (e.g. borrower 1) needs to pay for himself 
and for borrower 2 and vice versa in case three. As a result of group lending as-
surance, the creditor will receive the full repayment in all of these cases. The 
most interesting situation is the probability of , 22fp qρ ρ= +  , where both bor-
rowers fail and there is no repayment to the MFI. Note that project outcomes cor-
responding to a payoff of zero. With the Covariance between two realizations is 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1 2 1 20, 0 0 0 .Cov X X P X X P X P X= = = − = =        (18) 
If 1X  and 2X  are statistically independent, then ( )1 2 0Cov X X =  and if
( )1 2 0Cov X X ≠ , then ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1 20, 0 0 0 .P X X P X P X= = ≠ = =  
To calculate the joint probability of the failure event ,2fp ρ , I used the linear 
relationship of the borrower’ s project outcomes. The correlation coefficient ρ  
is described by 
( )
( ) ( )
1 2
1 2
Cov X X
Var X Var X
ρ =                     (19) 
or this formula can be rewritten using Steiner translation theorem as: 
( ) ( )
, 2
2
1 2
fp q
Var X Var X
ρ
ρ
−
=                     (20) 
The default correlation coefficient ρ  between ( )1 0P X =  and ( )2 0P X =  
has the value 1 1ρ− ≤ ≤  on the interval. 
Table 2 summarizes the probabilities of correlated outcomes in four possible 
events, with the parameter pqρ ρ= , , ,2 2s cp p pρ ρ= +  and , ,2 2f cq p pρ ρ= + . The 
sum Σ  can be rewritten as Equation (21) 
, , ,
2 2 212
s c fp p pρ ρ ρ=+ −
 
                      (21) 
 
Table 2. The four possible states of realization with correlated project outcomes. 
 Borrower 1 
Borrower 2 
 
Success: 0h >  
with ( )1P X p= =  
Failure: 0h =  
with ( )0P X q= =  Σ 
Success: 0h >  
with ( )1P X p= =  
, 2
2
sp pρ ρ= +   ,2
cp pqρ ρ= −   p  
Failure: 0h =  
with ( )0P X q= =  
,
2
cp pqρ ρ= −   , 22
fp qρ ρ= +   q  
Σ p  q  1 
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By applying these results, I calculate expected cost 2EC ρ  for 2n =  and 
compare it to 1EC  to conclude which contract is still efficient with regard to 
three constraints: (a) PC , (b) ZPC  and (c) ICC  as shown below: 
2 2 2 2: 0;PC Eh ER EC
ρ ρ ρ ρ− − ≥                    (22) 
2 2 ,
2
1: ;
1 f
ZPC R
p
ρ ρ
ρ= −
                     (23) 
,min
2 2 2 2: 2 .ICC C C R
ρ ρ ρ ρ≥ ≡                    (24) 
In the context of JLG, the expected cost of default for each borrower is given 
by the following Equation (25) 
,
2
2 ,
2
2 .
1
f
f
pEC
p
ρ
ρ
ρ= −
                        (25) 
The results of Equations (25) and (6) give us Proposition 2, which describes 
the efficiency contracts in this framework. 
Proposition 2 (Efficiency of JLG with correlated project realization):If the 
project outcomes are correlated, then the IL contract should be compared with 
the JLG contract. As long as the following condition is satisfied 
* 1
1 2
p q
p q
ρ ρ
−
≡ < =
+ −
                  (26) 
(with 
*
0
p
ρ∂
>
∂
, and 
*
0
q
ρ∂
<
∂
), the group based contract always minimizes 
the social costs of the group size 2n = . 
Prof: The condition of Proposition 2 comes from comparing Equation (6) 
with Equation (25) and is described as  
2 1.EC EC
ρ <                        (27) 
  
Condition as inequality (27) is satisfied for 0ρ = , which is similar to the re-
sults in Section 2. In addition, this condition satisfied 0ρ >  but only when the 
parameter is smaller than *ρ  as defined in (26).  
5. Efficiency Lending Contracts with n Borrowers 
I delineate a homogeneous JLG of n members. The project outcomes of borrow-
ers are correlated. The group size of 2n >  has ( )1 2n n −  counterparties, 
whose defaults are correlated with the correlation coefficient ρ  between each 
pair. Secondly, the failure probability in the group for each borrowers is the 
same and is denoted by q . Thirdly, the size of each credit in the group is one 
unit of capital. In this framework with n borrowers, there are 2n  possible 
probability events: 
{ }
{ }
{ }
{ }
,
1
,
1
,
1
,
1
1| 1
1| 0
, 2, ,
0 | 1
0 | 0
s
i in
c
i in
ij
c
i in
f
i in
P X Xp
P X Xp
P i n
P X Xp
P X Xp
ρ
ρ
ρ
ρ
−
−
−
−
   = =
   = =  
  = = ∀ =
  
= =  
   = =   


          (28) 
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As a result of JLG, if the expected project payoffs are large enough to satisfy 
( ),1 ,fnp h nρ− >                         (29) 
and define ,minn n nC C nRρ ρ ρ≥ ≡  is the total expected number of defaults in the 
group lending nnRρ  thus ,fn n nEC p nRρ ρ ρ= , then the lender will receive the full 
repayment in all these events except in the last case ,fnp ρ . This case implies that 
all borrowers fail, resulting in no repayment to the MFI, and the total number of 
defaults is ( )1 0
n
iX n= =∑ . The joint probability ,fnp ρ  takes on the value of 
the interval ,0 fnp qρ< < . Using this information, I distinguish three extremes: 
in the case of pairwise independent outcomes, it means that ( ) 0i jCov X X =  
thus 0ρ = .Then the corresponding value of the joint probability of total default 
has the value of ,f nnp qρ = . This result is consistent with RS’ findings and prop-
osition 1. In the other extreme of perfect positively correlated defaults, the va-
riance of a homogeneous group is 2n qp  and the joint probability of the total 
default corresponds to ,fnp qρ = . The third extreme, which implies ,fnp ρ  has 
the value of zero. As a result of these extremes the joint probability of defaults 
has the value ,0 fnp qρ< ≤  for 
0 1.
nq
pq
ρ
−
≤ ≤                        (30) 
This information is useful for creating the linear relationship between ex-
pected cost of default and the correlation coefficient as described in Equation 
(31) 
( )1 .
1
n
n n
nq nqEC
pq
ρ ρ ρ= − +
−
                  (31) 
Proposition 3 (Efficiency of JLG with correlated project realization and n 
borrowers): If the project outcomes are correlated, with ρ  for all pairs of bor-
rowers ( )i j≠ , then the IL contract should be compared with a JLG contract. 
As long as the following condition is satisfied 
** 1 ,
1
n
n
n
n
q nq
p q
nq nq
p q
ρ ρ
−
−
≡ ≤
−
−
                     (32) 
the group based contract for 2n ≥  always minimizes the social costs. 
Proof. The condition of Proposition 3 is calculated by comparing the expected 
costs of defaults between nEC ρ  in (31) and EC1 in (6), is described by (33) 
1.nEC EC
ρ ≤                          (33) 
6. Numerical Example 
In this section, to provide a better understanding of my findings, I computed the 
expected cost of default depending on the correlation parameter as provided in 
Equation (31). In this numerical example I assume that 0.5p = , then 
1 0.5q p= − = . Figure 1 illustrates the results, where the x-axis represents the  
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Figure 1. Expected cost of default dependence on ρ and on group size n. 
 
correlation coefficient. The y-axis represents the expected cost of default per 
borrower. 
The horizontal curve 1EC  describes the expected cost for an individual 
lending contract and the three other curves describe group-based lending con-
tracts. The black curve is calculated for 2n =  borrowers, the red curve is cal-
culated for 3n =  borrowers, and the blue curve is calculated for 5n =  bor-
rowers. This picture illustrates the relationship between a correlation parameter 
ρ  and group size n  on the expected cost of default. As before, (33) implies 
that the group based contract of size ( )2;n N∈  dominates the individual lend-
ing until the condition for **ijρ  if proposition 3 holds. By using Equation (31) as 
follows for 5n =  and 0.5p q= =  follows that 
( )
5
5 15
0.5 0.5 0.55 1 5 and 1.
0.5 0.51 0.5
EC ECρ ρρ ρ= − + = =
−
 
Compare both Equations for the correlation parameter thus, 5 1EC EC<  for 
** 0.173ρ < , for the couple 5 3EC EC<  implies ** 0.118ρ <  and so forth, I 
show the impact of the correlation coefficient in an optimal group size context. 
This example strengthens the importance of the correlated outcomes and endo-
genous group size in the context of efficient group lending contracts. By sum-
marizing the optimal group size results from this numerical example, I point out 
the minimized expected cost of default, which is distinguished by group size and 
depends on correlation ρ  
[ )
[ )
[ )
[ ]
*
*
*
*
5, for 1.00;0.118
3, for 0.118;0.191
2, for 0.191;0.330
1, for 0.330;1.00 .
n
n
n
EC
n
n
ρ
ρ
ρ
ρ
ρ
 = ∈ −

= ∈= 
= ∈
 = ∈
 
These results clearly show why correlation has a significant impact on optimal 
group size as characterized by minimizing the expected cost of default. 
M. Markheim 
 
1199 
7. Conclusions 
In this paper, I characterized a finite optimal group size with positively corre-
lated project outcomes in a strategic default setting. Furthermore, I focus on 
sensitization of the fundamental question of microcredit risk from the perspec-
tive of the optimal lending contract when the group size is endogenous and the 
risks are correlated. As we have seen, the correlation can be a major obstacle for 
the development of micro and small business in an Emerging Market. 
Again, I add to the existing literature on efficient group lending to consider 
the impact of correlation and of group size. The core of this paper shows that ef-
ficient contracts are dependent on appropriate group size in respect to statistical 
interdependence among project outcomes and credit risks as shown in Figure 1. 
I must emphasize that this research does not aim to solve the problem of stra-
tegic default and group-building process. Since the economy is complex, I do not 
know how much this new point of view will affect the future economic studies 
and the field experiments. Therefore future research should provide more in-
formation and evidence on this topic. I hope that this short discussion under-
lines the need to investigate the influence of inter- and intra-group risk of 
group-based microlending on the sustainable development of microfinance. 
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